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Introduction
In the early post-World-War-II period, rapid industrialization was widely considered to be the key to development. Historical and cross-country studies showing the declining relative weight of the agricultural sector in the transformation process from poor to rich seemed to reinforce this conclusion, and the view was also central to Marxist analysis in socialist countries. During this period, many countries pursued a development strategy of import substituting industrialization (ISI), which included a variety of policy measures such as: (1) high import tariffs on manufacturing to protect "infant" industries and export taxes on agriculture; (2) quantitative import controls, when tariff protection was viewed as providing inadequate protection; and (3) chronically overvalued exchange rates. Measures directly affecting the agricultural sector were also added, including: (1) agricultural marketing boards with monopoly powers, (2) centrally set producer and consumer prices, and (3) input subsidies. The ISI development strategy led to agriculture being both heavily taxed and neglected relative to industry.
The neglect of agriculture was heavily criticized in the 1960s (Schultz 1964) , but ISI policies were not effectively criticized for another decade. In a different, complementary vein, it was later pointed out by Lipton (1977) , who coined the term "urban bias", that the most important class conflict in poor countries was neither between labor and capital, nor between foreign and national interests, but between the rural and urban classes. The "Berg Report" (World Bank 1981) identified inappropriate domestic economic policies as the fundamental cause of the deepening agricultural crisis in SubSaharan Africa. "Getting prices right" became an influential catch phrase and it was suggested that this policy approach should be the key piece of advice to policy-makers in troubled economies. The neoclassical counter-revolution (Toye 1993) had arrived, and price reforms became a central component in the wide ranging economic reforms which African countries initiated from the mid-1980s onwards.
In addition, it gradually became clear to academics and policy makers alike that whatever the theoretical merits of the variety of interventionist measures employed by governments, they often led to seriously distorted incentives, inefficiencies, and rent seeking. The difference between the nominal and effective rates of protection afforded by tariff rates was analyzed theoretically and scrutinized empirically -and for good reasons. Empirical work indicated that effective protection of industrial products was often much higher than indicated by nominal protection rates, and the costs of intervention were shown to be very high indeed. Other macro policies and their impact on the performance of the agricultural sector, including the exchange rate, also came into focus.
Empirical studies on the effects of government price interventions in developing 2
The findings of a World Bank comparative study during 1987-90 involving 18 countries are 1 reported in Krueger (1992) and Schiff and Valdes (1992) . Eight country studies done at the International Food Policy Research Institute from 1981 to 1990 are contained in Bautista and Valdes (1993) , together with regional surveys of the literature in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
An extended discussion on empirical testing of the law of one price started from an article by Peter 2 Isard (1977) ; see Ceglowski (1994) ; Blaffes (1991); and Ardeni (1989). countries, especially those undertaken since the early 1980s, support the view that there was substantial policy bias against agriculture. First, producer prices are often found to 1 have been suppressed directly by sector-specific policies, commonly in the form of agricultural export taxation or the pricing policy of parastatal marketing organizations. Second, economywide policies, including trade and macroeconomic policies that influence the real exchange rate, are shown to have had significant indirect effects, invariably adverse, on agricultural incentives. In most cases, the indirect impact of economywide policies is found to be more important than the effect of direct government interventions.
In taking into account the additional effect on agricultural incentives arising from indirect government interventions, these studies have gone beyond the narrow, sectoral orientation of traditional agricultural policy analysis. However, in general, they have relied on analytical frameworks that are partial equilibrium. Economists have long recognized that the partial measures used in applied work are incomplete and that a general equilibrium framework is needed to capture all the interactions that determine the net relative impact of a mix of policies on the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. "Policy bias" is inherently an economywide, general equilibrium concept. Nevertheless, to date there has been no systematic evaluation of the extent of agricultural bias of government interventions using a general equilibrium framework.
Another critical problem with partial equilibrium approaches is that they typically assume perfect substitutability between domestically produced and imported goods, as well as between domestic products for export and for internal use. Under these assumptions, we should never observe two-way trade ("cross hauling") at the commodity level. If a good is tradable, the "law of one price" holds and changes in world prices should be completely translated into changes in domestic prices. Furthermore, the responsiveness of sectoral domestic prices to changes in world prices or in trade policies does not depend on the shares of trade in sectoral demand or supply. It matters only that the good is "tradable", not how much it is traded. All these implications of the law of one price are empirically suspect. For example, 2 two-way trade is observed in highly disaggregated sectoral data for virtually all countries 3 Peterson, Hertel, and Stout (1994) consider the violation of the law of one price in the context of a 3 partial equilibrium, multi-commodity, agricultural trade model. For a recent survey on general equilibrium analysis applied to agriculture, see Hertel (1997) .
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A related measure of government support to agriculture, the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), 6 was developed during the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations and includes both trade and non-trade policies. It is also a partial equilibrium measure which treats trade basically the same way as the Krueger, Schiff, Valdes (de Melo and Robinson 1981; de Melo and Tarr 1992) . Within agriculture in developing countries, there are also significant shares of non-traded goods or goods with very low trade shares. In any case, the transmission elasticities vary widely across sectors. Evidence for major traded agricultural commodities indicates that price transmission elasticities are close to one for developed countries, although significantly lower for developing countries (Mundlak and Larson 1992) . Ardeni (1989) , on the other hand, finds that changes in world prices or trade policy measures are generally only partially transmitted through to prices of domestic substitutes. In general, elasticities of substitution and transformation 3 are much lower for industrial goods in developing countries, especially intermediates and capital goods.
By contrast, a widely used specification in multisector, trade-focused, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models is that imports are imperfect substitutes for domestically produced goods with the same sectoral classification. Similarly, in many models, exports are also differentiated from domestically produced goods sold on the domestic market. This formulation removes the extreme dichotomy between tradable and non-tradable goods, allowing differing degrees of tradability corresponding to different values of the substitution and transformation elasticities (which are either infinite or zero in the partial equilibrium approach, depending on whether the good is traded or not). This specification gives some realistic autonomy to the domestic price system in the model and can account for cross-hauling. 4 In this paper, we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that incorporates the more realistic assumption of imperfect substitutability to provide a comprehensive framework to capture the various repercussions of policy interventions and measure their impact on agriculture. Assuming that the economic environment is 5 characterized by trade policy distortions such as the ones in focus in Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes (1988) , we will consider the differences between general equilibrium measures of the agricultural sector bias as compared to the results of partial equilibrium analysis.
approach (FAO 1975; Josling and Tangermann 1989; Webb et al. 1990) .
Following this introduction, the partial measures used in previous work are presented. Section 3 discusses how the bias against agriculture can be measured in a CGE model (fully specified in Annex II), and indicates why this frame of reference is preferable to the partial equilibrium approach. The results of a series of policy experiments designed to provide answers to the questions raised above are reported in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
Agricultural bias: partial equilibrium, no product differentiation
If a country is small and there is perfect substitutability between domestically produced and imported goods, a change in the import price will -under competitive conditions -lead to the same change in the domestic producer price of the importable good. Likewise, if domestic products for export and for internal use are perfect substitutes, the domestic producer price of the exportable good will be equal to its domestic-currency border price equivalent. However, in practice, government policies can drive wedges between foreign and domestic prices. Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes (1988) developed measures of the impact of these policies on agricultural producer prices. These measures are used to assess whether the policy-induced incentive structure favors or discriminates against agricultural production, i.e. whether the sector is protected or not relative to non-agriculture. They distinguish between policies that have direct and indirect effects on agricultural incentives.
Policies with direct effects include agricultural sector-specific import and export taxes, price controls, and production taxes and subsidies, all of which affect the wedge between producer and border prices of agricultural products. Policies with indirect effects on agricultural incentives, on the other hand, include the exchange rate, which affects the economywide balance between traded and non-traded goods, and import tariffs on nonagricultural products. Contrary to the assumption used by Krueger et al., we recognize below the latter's influence on the exchange rate.
Let
be the domestic producer price of a specific tradable agricultural product iag, the border-price equivalent at the official exchange rate E , and the 0 nonagricultural producer price index defined as the weighted average of non-agricultural producer prices. The relative producer prices of agricultural products vis-a-vis the non-
agricultural aggregate price are given by .
The direct agricultural bias against products indexed by iag is defined as the proportionate deviation of relative prices from what they would have been without direct interventions:
This measure is meant to capture the impact on producer incentives of commodity-specific policies, and it corresponds to the widely used "nominal protection rate" in the empirical trade literature.
be the border price evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate E*, and define as the nonagricultural price index where the tradable part is evaluated at E*, defined as a situation with a sustainable trade balance and no trade restrictions. In this case, E* differs from E to the extent that the current account is set at an unsustainable 0 level and trade interventions are in place. The relative price is given by where , and Xt refers to tradable goods (whose price is evaluated at the equilibrium exchange rate, E*) and Xnt refers to non-traded, nonagricultural goods.
The indirect agricultural bias against the sector indexed by iag is the proportionate deviation of from :
This measure is meant to capture the indirect effects on producer incentives of the exchange rate disequilibrium (E differing from E*) and of trade policy affecting 0 (e.g., industrial protection). Notably, does not appear in the right-hand side of equation (2). Hence, the indirect agricultural bias is the same for all tradable agricultural
goods. The implicit assumption that and are independent shows that the partial equilibrium framework does not capture intersectoral price linkages and also assumes no repercussion through changes in the exchange rate induced by the price changes.
The exchange rate affects the terms-of-trade ratio depending on the shares of traded and non-traded goods within the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. If all goods in the economy are tradable, then the exchange rate is irrelevant since, in that case, all domestic relative prices are set by world prices. The exchange rate is important precisely because there are non-traded goods. In the Krueger, Schiff, Valdes studies, the agricultural products they considered were tradable (i.e., some observed exports or imports) and some non-agricultural goods were not tradable. In that environment, exchange rate changes affect tradable agriculture much more than partially non-traded non-agriculture. Considering agriculture as a whole, it is important to consider non-traded agricultural goods in defining aggregate terms-of-trade indices.
The total agricultural bias against sector iag can be represented by the proportionate deviation of from :
which captures the effects of both direct and indirect government interventions.
The three measures are related as follows:
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (4) is a modified measure of the direct agricultural bias, which is usually smaller (in absolute value) than the nominal protection rate since is typically less than in developing countries.
In contrast with the partial equilibrium measures used by Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes, which are concerned with producer price incentives only, a general equilibrium approach will capture intersectoral resource shifts, product differentiation in production pm i ' pwm i 1 % tm i EXR and
and demand, and the effect of induced price changes on the equilibrium exchange rate. The result is a richer specification of the price system and a more complete concept of agricultural bias.
Agricultural bias: general equilibrium and product differentiation
If domestically produced and imported goods (D and M respectively) are i i imperfect substitutes, the price of the domestic good, pd , will no longer be equal to the i domestic-currency price of the import substitute, pm , as in the partial equilibrium i framework. Similarly, if there is imperfect substitutability between domestic products for export (e ) and for internal use, their prices -pe and pd respectively -will not be
identical. It follows that the domestic prices of exported and imported products are not determined by the law of one price.
Structure of the applied CGE approach
Following Armington (1969), we can introduce product differentiation by defining a composite good q which is a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) function of the respectively, where EXR is the exchange rate (in domestic currency per unit of foreign currency), and tm and te are the implicit tariff and export tax rates, respectively, that take i i account of the legal tariffs and export taxes as well as any quantitative trade restrictions and direct price controls that affect the disparity between the domestic and border prices of traded goods.
(10)
From the underlying general equilibrium model used here (see Annex II for a complete specification), the relationships between relative prices and quantities are:
These equations reflect first-order conditions for utility and profit maximization.
Sectoral composite good prices are the weighted averages of the domestic prices of their component products:
where the CES and CET functions refer to cost functions relating the composite prices to their component prices. They reflect the first-order conditions described above.
Equations 5 -10 are imbedded in the structure of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model incorporating differentiated products. This model permits the determination of the direct effects of government interventions (captured in tm and te ) on agricultural i i prices, and also their indirect effects through intersectoral linkages and induced changes in the exchange rate.
To make the CGE agricultural bias results derived in this study as comparable as possible to the partial measures described above, we adapt the CGE model to provide a "clean" theoretical starting point for measuring policy bias and also use the framework for doing controlled experiments that isolate particular effects.
First, in the model, factor markets have been segmented with respect to aggregate agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Labor and capital can move between sectors 9
In fact, in most of their country studies, overvaluation was the greatest source of policy bias against 7 agriculture.
within agriculture and non-agriculture, but cannot move between agriculture and nonagriculture. In this model, the derived agricultural sector bias measures reflect only price changes and intra-sectoral resource shifts. The partial equilibrium measures focus only on prices, and so indicate potential resource pulls if factors were free to move between agriculture and non-agriculture. In the CGE model, by restricting factor mobility between agriculture and non-agriculture, the resulting equilibrium prices, and measures of bias based on them, should be comparable to the partial equilibrium measures. In an "unrestricted" CGE model, allowing inter-aggregate-sector factor mobility, adjustment would include both price and quantity effects. In general, allowing quantity adjustment will reduce price adjustment, so the segmentation should lead to price effects which are upper bounds. Indeed, the most appropriate measure of bias would be to allow full factor mobility and measure changes in value added across sectors with removal (or addition) of distorting policies.
Second, as the base for our experiments, we create a distortion-free benchmark solution of the model to provide the theoretically best reference point for the analysis. To achieve this undistorted economic environment, all production, sales, and trade taxes in the base data are removed. The lost revenue is made up by means of a non-distorting, lump-sum income tax on households, yielding the base value of government revenuethe standard approach in public finance models.
Third, the general equilibrium model incorporates the indirect effect of changes in tariffs and export subsidies on the economy through their impact on the equilibrium exchange rate -an indirect effect ignored in the partial equilibrium approach. To isolate this effect, we run a variant of the tariff and export subsidy experiments in which we fix the exchange rate, and so "turn off" this mechanism. In order to fix the exchange rate, we have specified a different macro "closure" and assumed that the trade balance adjusts endogenously.
Fourth, in the Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes methodology, overvaluation of the exchange rate is a major source of policy bias against agriculture. In a general equilibrium See Devarajan, Lewis, and Robinson (1993) for a discussion of the real exchange rate in this class of 8 CGE models. Unlike Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes, no separate model is required to estimate the equilibrium real exchange rate. To measure the effect of changes in the exchange rate only (i.e., with no changes in distorting sectoral taxes), we report on a set of additional experiments where we systematically reduce the trade balance to zero, and solve for the resulting equilibrium exchange rates, and all other prices and quantities. The results show the sensitivity of the various agricultural terms-of-trade measures with respect to depreciation of the exchange rate arising from the elimination of the trade deficit.
Finally, since the focus of the analysis is on the production rather than the consumption side, the non-traded producer price index of goods sold on the domestic market has been chosen as the numeraire of the model. For this choice, the solution value of the exchange rate measures the relative price of traded goods to non-traded goodsthe "real" exchange rate of trade theory. In public finance models, it is common to use the 8 consumer price index as numeraire, which is convenient for welfare analysis. The choice is only a matter of convenience. The model is a neoclassical general equilibrium model and only determines relative prices.
An overview on the underlying domestic price transmission mechanism is presented in Figure 1 . A description of the structure of the model used for deriving quantitative estimates of the various measures of agricultural bias is presented in Table 1 
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As discussed in the introduction, a major shortcoming of the partial equilibrium approach is the assumed complete transmission of world price changes to domestic prices. Figure 1 shows the price links in the CGE model. Domestic prices of exported and imported products are determined by world market prices plus any trade taxes (given the small country assumption). However, domestic sectoral producer prices (px) are CET cost functions of export prices (pe) and domestic prices (pd). Similarly, the composite good prices (pq) are CES cost functions of import prices (pm) and domestic prices. The strength of price transmission effects depends both on elasticities (of substitution and transformation) and on trade shares. There are also links working through intermediate inputs, which include imported and domestic goods, and finally to factor prices. In this model, the policy bias against agriculture will depend on differences in policies, trade shares, and the degree of tradability between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. 
Measures and policy experiments in the CGE framework
In the general equilibrium approach used here, the measure of agricultural bias is captured through various measures of the terms of trade between aggregate agriculture and aggregate non-agriculture. They are defined as the ratio of the relevant price indices. For example, the agricultural terms of trade with respect to gross output X in domestic producer prices can be represented as follows:
where The share parameters are the gross output shares of individual sub-sectors in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. The sum of these shares within each aggregate sector equals one.
The aggregate sectoral producer price indices are defined as:
The terms-of-trade measures within the CGE framework are constructed using the following prices and corresponding quantity weights: pm M domestic market price and quantity of imports pe E domestic market price and quantity of exports pq Q composite good price and quantity px X producer price and gross output pva X value added price and quantity 
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The SAM is based on preliminary data for Tanzania, which is in the process of being refined and 9 disaggregated further. See Wobst (forthcoming) for a description of the data base. As noted earlier, the reported data are for a distortion-free base solution of the model.
Other government policies such as sales taxes or fixed producer prices could also be investigated 10 within the CGE framework. However, in the present analysis, we focus on trade policy-induced distortions.
Agricultural TOT regarding pe and E.
Agricultural TOT regarding pq and Q Agricultural TOT regarding px and X Agricultural TOT regarding pva and X A 28 sector -of which 13 are agricultural sectors -social accounting matrix (SAM) for Tanzania (base year 1990) provides the starting data base for our policy simulations. Given that we start from a distortion-free base solution of the model, the 9 data should be seen as reflecting a "stylized" version of a Tanzania-like economy. The structure of the economy is presented in Table 2 , which provides sector-specific information on production, value-added, and trade shares; export and import ratios with respect to total production and absorption; and elasticities of substitution and transformation. The characteristics of this economic structure that significantly influence the results of the analysis can be summarized as follows:
• The share of agriculture in total gross production is 42 percent, and 56 percent in value-added at market prices. This economy is dominated by agriculture.
• The share of agriculture in total exports is only 26 percent, but the two most important agricultural export sectors (coffee and tea) have export-production ratios of around 80 percent. Most exports are non-agricultural, but there are some very export-dependent agricultural sectors.
• There are virtually no agricultural imports. Most imports are intermediate and capital goods for which elasticities of substitution with domestic production is low. One sector, "fuel", which includes petrochemicals, has high import and export ratios, indicating the existence of "pass-through" exports.
Four experiments are carried out to simulate the impact of introducing significant industrial protection and taxation of agricultural exports, with and without a fixed exchange rate. The first experiment simulates an "import substitution industrialization" 15 (ISI) strategy by imposing a 25 percent import tariff (tm(iagn) = 25%) on all nonagricultural imports. This sort of ISI strategy should hurt agriculture by: (a) raising the relative price of non-agricultural goods, which are import substitutes, compared to agriculture; (b) increasing the costs of production in agriculture (since non-agricultural commodities are used as intermediate inputs in agriculture); and (c) inducing an appreciation of the exchange rate which will hurt export-oriented agricultural sectors.
The induced appreciation of the exchange rate represents an indirect effect which is considered to be independent in the partial equilibrium approach to measuring agricultural bias. To estimate the separate effect of this appreciation, in experiment 2 we also increase the non-agricultural tariff as in experiment 1 and also fix the exchange rate, which serves to isolate the indirect exchange-rate effect. With the exchange rate fixed, the model is solved by endogenously adjusting the trade balance (as discussed above). This additional experiment allows comparison with the partial equilibrium measures which analyze the effects of taxation under the assumption of a fixed exchange rate.
The third and fourth experiments simulate the implementation of a 25 percent tax on all agricultural exports, again with a free and fixed exchange rate (te(iag) = 25% and EXR is either free or fixed). The impact of an export tax on agriculture in a partial equilibrium framework with a fixed exchange rate is referred to as the direct bias against agriculture. In the general equilibrium framework, the effect of an export tax can be divided into two components: (a) price changes due to trade price transmission effects, given the CES-CET functional structure of the model; and (b) price changes due to the induced exchange-rate effect.
In the partial equilibrium literature, a major source of policy bias is the overvaluation of the exchange rate, even with no sectoral price distortions. To assess this effect, we perform a series of five experiments where we leave all sectoral taxes at zero but reduce the base value of the trade balance in 20 percent increments, reaching zero in the last experiment. A trade balance of zero is often specified as defining the "appropriate" equilibrium value of the exchange rate in the partial equilibrium literature. Defining an equilibrium or "sustainable" trade balance is a macro issue, outside the scope of our static general equilibrium model. In the CGE model, there is a functional relationship between the exchange rate and the trade balance, and hence between the trade balance and measures of policy bias arising from changes in the equilibrium exchange rate. The five experiments demonstrate this relationship. Table 2 presents the impact on the various agricultural terms-of-trade measures of the imposition of the 25 percent non-agriculture import and agriculture export taxes, with and without a fixed exchange rate. The agricultural terms-of-trade measures and their underlying aggregate price indices are shown in the rows. The first two agricultural termsof-trade measures with regard to traded goods ( and ) capture priceincentive effects which are close to the partial equilibrium measure. The last three measures ( , , and ) capture the transmission of price changes from traded goods through commodity, output, and value-added prices, reflecting general equilibrium linkages, the Armington specification of imperfect substitutability, and finally the operation of factor markets.
Industrial protection and agricultural export taxes
The last row shows that the exchange rate, which is fixed in experiments 2 and 4, appreciates by approximately 5 percent in experiment 1 and depreciates by 5 percent in experiment 3. The signs of the induced changes are predictable from theory -the magnitudes depend on model parameters and the structure of the economy. The first agricultural terms-of-trade measure ( ) shows a 20 percent deterioration for experiment 2 due to the 25 percent increase of the non-agricultural price index . World market prices in equation 5 are fixed in all experiments, given the small-country assumption, and the exchange rate is fixed as part of experiment 2. In the first two experiments, the 25 percent increase in import tariffs on non-agricultural production (tm(iagn) = 25%) leads to a 20 percent decrease in the terms of trade (1/ We now turn to the impact of the experiments series on , , and
. The third measure of the agricultural terms of trade ( ) is defined with respect to composite good prices and captures the Armington specification, i.e. the imperfect substitutability between imports and domestic products (equation 9). The imposition of a 25 percent non-agricultural import tariff reduces to 90.2 percent when the exchange rate is fixed. The composite good price index of non-agricultural commodities ( ), which is effected by domestic import prices (pm) as well as domestic supply prices (pd), increases by only 7.3 percent instead of the 25 percent increase of . For a "semi-tradable" good, both the import share and the substitution elasticity affect how changes in import prices are transmitted through to the price of domestic substitutes, and hence to the price of the composite good. 
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The agricultural price index drops to 96.9 percent. When the exchange rate is free, these effects are dampened and drops to only 94.4 percent. The effect of not allowing the exchange rate feedback on amounts to 4.2 percent points. Allowing exchange rate flexibility means that agriculture gets hurt less.
The 25 percent export tax on agricultural commodities affects the composite good price index of agriculture by only 0.7 percent due to the limited magnitude of agricultural exports as compared to domestic supply -most of agriculture is not traded. When exchange rate feedback is allowed, EXR depreciates and the agricultural composite good price index drops while non-agriculture gains. The net result is that the export tax affects relatively little when the exchange rate is fixed, but substantially more with a flexible exchange rate.
The fourth agricultural terms-of-trade measure ( ) is defined with respect to producer prices (px), reflecting the imperfect transformation between domestic produce and exports in the CET function. The 25 percent import tariff in experiments 1 and 2 lowers in a similar way as . Moreover, allowing for exchange rate flexibility results in an appreciation of the exchange rate and improves compared to the fixed exchange rate scenario. This result is a reflection of the very large share of non-traded agricultural products in total agriculture, which implies that aggregate agriculture is favored when the exchange rate appreciates. In addition, the price index of nonagricultural producer prices is higher under a fixed exchange rate.
In sum, is 98.3 percent under a flexible exchange rate and 94.9 percent under a fixed exchange rate. In case of the 25 percent export tax on agricultural products in experiments 3 and 4, the agricultural terms of trade are affected more under a flexible exchange rate than under a fixed exchange rate, while the direct impact of the export tax appears relatively limited. The depreciation following the imposition of the export tax in experiment 3 has a negative influence on the agricultural terms of trade . This result again is linked to the high share of non-traded agriculture, which is hurt in relative terms by a depreciation. In the partial equilibrium literature, most agricultural commodities are treated as perfectly substitutable tradable goods for which eliminating an overvaluation of the exchange rate is beneficial.
Changes in the terms of trade in value-added prices provide the most appropriate bias measure because it indicates relative incentives to "pull" productive factors between sectors. A non-agricultural tariff combined with a flexible exchange rate improves the terms of trade of agriculture, whereas agriculture is hurt in relative terms under a fixed exchange rate. As noted above, agriculture is relatively non-traded, and therefore benefits from an appreciation of the exchange rate. Similarly, in the export tax experiment, exchange rate flexibility implies that drops compared to the situation with fixed exchange rate.
Impacts of an overvaluation of the exchange rate
The results of the experiment series in which we gradually reduce the trade balance to zero are reported in Figures 2, 3 , and 4. Figure 2 shows that the trade balance is eliminated in five consecutive steps, resulting in exchange rate depreciations starting at almost 4 percent at the beginning and declining to about 1 percent at the last step. Elimination of the trade deficit leads to a depreciation of 10 percent. The corresponding adjustments in real imports and exports are shown in Figure 3 . Imports move very little while exports increase by around 130 percent -the improvement of the balance of payments is mainly a consequence of export performance. The import-dependent nature of the economy, with high trade shares and low substitution elasticities for intermediates and capital goods, makes it difficult to reduce imports. They even increase a little in spite of the depreciation, which reflects the import-intensive nature of exports. This result, which is typical of many developing countries, underlines the need 
21
The development of the relative export shares of total agriculture and non-agriculture throughout 11 the experiment series is shown in Figure 6 and 7 of Annex 1.
to maintain imports at an adequate level if export promotion is to succeed.
11
Finally, Figure 4 demonstrates that although the last three agricultural terms of trade indices fall as the exchange rate depreciates, the changes are small -under 5 percent. The first two indices, and , do not change since changes in the exchange rate effect agriculture and non-agriculture symmetrically. The other three agricultural terms-of-trade measures ( , , and ) decrease in the beginning due to the induced depreciation of the exchange rate. However, the effect tapers off in the middle of the experiment series, and the measures improve a little at the end. The turnaround is due to the fact that agricultural exports increase with depreciation and, by the last two experiments in the series, grow to be a significant share of agricultural output. With depreciation, traded agriculture becomes more important as can be seen from Figure  5 .
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the extent of the policy bias against agriculture in a general equilibrium framework. Various measures of the agricultural terms of trade are constructed to assess the impact of industrial protection, agricultural export taxes, and overvaluation of the exchange rate on the balance between agriculture and nonagriculture. The general equilibrium measures are compared with earlier work measuring 22 policy bias in a partial equilibrium framework.
Our results indicate that trade policies -in particular, 25 percent non-agricultural tariffs and 25 percent agricultural export taxes -have a significant but much lower negative impact on relative prices in agriculture than would be indicated by partial equilibrium measures. The general equilibrium framework captures indirect effects of trade policies that work through induced changes in the equilibrium exchange rate -an effect that is not captured in partial equilibrium analysis. We use the model to compute the empirical importance of this indirect effect, which is potentially significant. The imposition of a non-agricultural tariff with a fixed exchange rate leads to a much stronger deterioration of the terms-of-trade measures as compared to a flexible exchange rate scenario since the appreciation of the latter cannot diminish the tariff effect. The imposition of an export tax on all agricultural sectors with a fixed exchange rate leads to a much lower deterioration as compared to a flexible exchange rate scenario since the export tax can't induced a depreciation of the exchange rate that hurts relatively nontraded aggregate agriculture in the case of a flexible exchange rate.
A separate series of experiments is carried out to assess the impact of overvaluation of the exchange rate -characteristic of many developing countries. In earlier work in a partial equilibrium framework, comparative work in a number of countries identified exchange rate overvaluation as the largest source of policy bias. In a general equilibrium framework incorporating non-traded goods and imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, these results are seriously qualified.
In our archetype model of Tanzania, agriculture has a large share of non-traded goods and traded non-agriculture goods have relatively low substitution elasticities. These characteristics reflect many developing countries. In this environment, we find a much smaller impact on agriculture of depreciating the exchange rate than is indicated by partial equilibrium measures. General equilibrium effects are important. Export Share of Total Non-Agriculture
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Annex I
An explanation of the applied sector abbreviations is presented in 
# Equation Description
The model is square and satisfies Walras' law. 
